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Title VII: An Employer's View of Religious
Discrimination Since The 1972 Amendment
And it came to pass again as He was going through the standing
grain on the Sabbath, that His disciples began, as they went along,
to pluck the ears of grain. But the Pharisees said to Him, "Behold,
why are they doing what is not lawful on the Sabbath?". . . And
He said to them, "The Sabbath was made for man, and not man
for the Sabbath . . .,,i

Several forms of employment discrimination are prohibited by
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 (hereinafter Act).
Potentially the most volatile 3 of these species is employment discrimination based upon religion.4 Most of the litigation' under the
provisions of the Act has involved allegations of racial or sex discrimination.6 However, the relatively sparse number of religious discrimination cases have presented provocative legal issues. The ramifications of these issues affect individuals, employers, and society
as a whole. Religious discrimination is as debilitating to the social
and economic spheres of our society as are other proscribed employment practices. Such discrimination impinges upon areas vital to
the existence of a morally healthy work force and inhibits the free
1. Mark 2:23-28.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970), as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (Supp. II,
1972). For the specific proscriptions which the Act sets forth, see text accompanying note 22
infra.
3. See Gilbert, Religious Freedom and Social Change in a PluralisticSociety: A Historical
Review, in RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 96 (D. Gianella ed. 1964), where the author states:
An examination of American history reveals that social change in the relationship
among America's religious groups has rarely been achieved without some degree of
violence. Protestant dissenters, Roman Catholics, Jehovah's Witnesses, Jews, each
in turn have suffered physical assault because they challenged the prevailing definitions of the church-state relationship and insisted on a re-definition of religious
freedom.
4. In the first year of the existence of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), the agency entrusted with implementing the Act, only 87 complaints of religious
discrimination were referred to it. 1 EEOC ANN. REP. 58 (1967). The number has increased
steadily, and in 1972 the Commission reported that 1,176 complaints were filed. 7 EEOC ANN.
REP. 54 (1973).
5. The procedure for litigation under the Act is provided in section 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5 (1970), as amended (Supp. II, 1972), which provides that an employee alleging discrimination may file a charge before the EEOC. The EEOC will attempt to resolve the conflict by
conciliation with the employer. If this should fail, the Act provides that the EEOC may bring
a civil action against the employer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), or the employee may bring his own action against the employer
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. H, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
6. Note, Religious Discrimination in Employment: The 1972 Amendment - A
Perspective, 3 FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 327 (1975).
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exercise of religion protected by the first amendment.7 Indeed, the
freedom of an individual to practice his religion without fear of
discrimination ought to be recognized by all sectors of the economic
community.
It is the purpose of this article to investigate the application of
this recent federal legislation directed at prohibiting religious discrimination in employment. The scope is limited to the consideration of alleged acts of discrimination which arise from a conflict
between an employer's work schedule and an employee's exercise of
his religious beliefs or practices. Underlying the application of the
Act are two seemingly conflicting values: the need for an employee
to exercise his religious beliefs or practices without fear of a consequent loss of job opportunities and the right of an employer to
employ the best qualified individual for a job in view of uncertain
and demanding work schedules.8 Since the enactment of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 19721 (hereinafter Amendment),
amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964, doubt has arisen as to what
actions on the part of an employer constitute religious discrimination. Examination of the recent case law concerning the application
of the Act since the enactment of the Amendment provides an employer with criteria which can be utilized to comply with the law.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGION AS AN IMPERMISSIBLE BASIS OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

Religious freedom has always been considered one of the fundamental rights of a free society.' 0 It is considered by some to hold the
7. The first amendment to the Constitution guarantees the freedoms of religion and
speech:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abriding the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.
8. See Note, Religious Observance and Discriminationin Employment, 22 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1019, 1020 (1971).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. H, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
10. Edwards and Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role of Arbitration Under
Title VII, 69 MICH. L. REV. 599, 602 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Edwards and Kaplan]. For
a discussion of the historical basis of religious freedom in the United States, see Fellman,
Religion in American Public Law, 44 B.U. L. REV. 287 (1964). See also 2 T. COOLEY, A
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 960 (8th ed. 1927), where the noted author states:
A careful examination of the American Constitutions will disclose the fact that
nothing is more fully set forth or more plainly expressed than the determination of
their authors to preserve and perpetuate religious liberty, and to guard against the
slightest approach towards the establishment of an inequality in the civil and
political rights of citizens, which shall have for its basis only their differences of
religious belief.
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supreme place in the heirarchy of American civil rights. Although
other first amendment freedoms may be more important to society
in the aggregate, none is as important to the individual person as
the freedom of religion." From its first construction of the free exercise clause 2 in Reynolds v. United States, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the protections accorded religious beliefs and opinions." That these rights remain protected is manifested by Justice Stewart's comment in Sherbert v. Verner":
I am convinced that no liberty is more essential to the continued
vitality of the free society which our Constitution guarantees than
is the religious liberty protected by the Free Exercise Clause ...,
Yet, prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
concern of the courts with religious discrimination had been primarily limited to cases involving the infringement of religious rights by
federal or state 8 legislation. The first amendment guarantees of
religious freedom protected the individual from governmental but
not private interference.'" Employment discrimination in the private sector which was based solely upon religion was not unlawful.
Congress sought to eliminate employment discrimination based
solely upon religion by the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.20 Section 703(a) of the Act makes it an "unlawful em2
ployment practice" for an employer: '
11.

Saladin, Relative Ranking of the Preferred Freedoms: Religion and Speech, in

RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

171 (D. Gianella ed. 1964).

13. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Reynolds, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal
polygamy law and voiced the proposition that, although laws may interfere with religious
practices, they may not interfere with religious beliefs and opinions. Id. at 166.
14. See Clark, Guidelines For The Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327 (1969).
15. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, the Court held that a state unemployment compensation law was unconstitutional because it denied benefits in a manner which discriminated
on the basis of religion. The plaintiff was a Seventh Day Adventist and was denied benefits
under the law because she had been discharged by her employer for refusing to work on her
Sabbath. The Court found that although the law was not discriminatory on its face, its effect
placed a burden on the plaintiff's free exercise of her religion in violation of the first amendment.
16. 374 U.S. 398, 413 (Stewart, J., concurring).
17. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
18. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
19. Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953). These freedoms are
binding on the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
20. The reference to religious discrimination in Title VII was not intended to restate the
first amendment rights; rather, the Civil Rights Act is broader in scope for it is grounded on
Congress' regulatory power under the commerce clause of the Constitution. Edwards and
Kaplan, supra note 10, at 603.
21. Section 701(b) of the Act defines "employer" as follows:
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(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunitites or otherwise adversely effect his status as an employee, because of such individ2
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.1

The legislative history23 of the Act reveals that the primary intent
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a
person, but such term does not include (1) the United States, a corporation wholly
owned by the Government of the United States, an Indian tribe, or any department
or agency of the District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the competitive service ... except that during the first year after March 24, 1972, persons
having fewer than twenty-five employees (and their agents) shall not be considered
employers.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Supp. , 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. 2000e (1970).
Congress placed a limitation on the broad proscriptions of section 703(a) with section 703(e)
which provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter (1) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees. . . on the
basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion,
sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise ....
Id. § 2000e-2(e).
23. The legislative history of the Act reveals the lack of attention given to the subject of
religious discrimination. The following are statements made during House debates on the bill:
MR. ABERNATHY (of Mississippi). I notice in examining the various titles of the
bill that an attempt is made to eliminate several alleged and various kinds of
discrimination on the ground of race, color, religion or national origin. Did the
gentleman's committee hear any testimony on any discrimination practiced against
any people of this country because of their religion?
MR. CELLER (of New York). We had testimony concerning religion. We did not
have very much testimony of discriminations on the grounds of religion ...
MR. ABERNATHY

. . . Who were the people who were being discriminated

against because of religion, of what religious faith?
MR. CELLER. We had very little evidence - I do not think we had any of it
insofar as the Committee on the Judiciary is concerned that any particular sect or
religion had been discriminated against.
MR. RODINO (of New Jersey). . . I quote from the testimony by Father Cronin,
as shown on page 2030 of the hearings. Father Cronin stated:
I don't believe that need is very pressing at this time. There are remnants of
religious discrimination in the United States, but compared to the instant
problem before us, of the civil rights of the Negro Community, these are very,
very minor and peripheral and I would not have any feeling that this should
be broadened. . ..
110 CONG. REc. 1528-29 (1964).
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of Congress was to remedy the pervasive problems caused by racial
discrimination.24 However, the inclusion of religion as an impermissible basis of employment discrimination reflects congressional recognition of the importance of religious freedom in the United States.
When considering the sensitivity of an individual's beliefs and the
religious heterogeneity of this Nation's population, the protection of
religious freedom in the employment area is a concern with which
the law must cope.
PRE-AMENDMENT PROBLEMS

An early judicial construction of section 703(a) indicates that the
protection of religious liberties which Congress sought to afford to
employees was not initially realized.2 7 Commentators point to the
failure of Congress to provide the courts with a workable definition
of "religion" and to a lack of guidance 29 from the legislative history
of the Act 3° as contributing factors to the courts' reticence. As a
result questions arose whether an intent to discriminate on religious
grounds was a necessary element to a finding of an unlawful employment practice under section 703(a). 31 In addition, uncertainty ex32
isted regarding enforcement of Title VII prohibitions.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Dewey
v. Reynolds Metal Company33 marked the first judicial construction
24. Note, Title VII - Religious Discriminationin Employment - Is "Effect on Individual
Religious Belief" DiscriminationBased on Religion Under The Civil Rights Act of 1964?, 16
WAYNE L. REV. 327, 332 (1969).
25. Edwards and Kaplan, supra note 11, at 600.
26. The religious diversity of our Nation's population was recognized by Mr. Justice
Brennan in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) where he
observed:
[Ojur religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people than were our
forefathers. Today the Nation is far more heterogeneous religiously, including as it
does substantial minorities not only of Catholics and Jews but as well of those who
worship according to no version of the Bible and those who worship no God at all
... . [P]ractices which may have been objectionable to no one in the time of
Jefferson and Madison may today be highly offensive to many persons, the deeply
devout and the non-believers alike. 374 U.S. 203, 240-41 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
27. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Company, 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 402 US. 689 (1971).
28. See Note, Religious Discriminationin Employment: The 1972 Amendment - A Perspective, 3 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 327, 328 (1975).
29. Edwards and Kaplan, supra note 11, at 602.
30. For further discussion see note 23 supra, and accompanying text.
31. See Note, Employer Held to Have Engaged in Religious Discrimination Under Title
VII Without Proof of DiscriminatoryIntent, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1147 (1969).
32. See generally, Note, The Scope of the Attorney General's Power Under Title VII:
Appraisal and Reform, 2 RurGEs - CAMDEN L.J. 185 (1970).
33. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
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of section 703(a) concerning religious discrimination. The decision
and its ramifications demonstrate the difficulty encountered by
courts in interpreting the broad proscriptions of the Act. In Dewey,
the court was confronted with the question of whether an employer
could lawfully discharge an employee who had violated a provision
of a collective bargaining agreement. Dewey was a member of the
Faith Reformed Church whose religious tenets required his abstention from employment on Sunday. As an employee of Reynolds he
was also a member of Local 277 of the United Automobile and
Agricultural Workers of America which had negotiated a collective
bargaining agreement with the company. A provision of the agreement obligated all of Reynolds' employees "to perform all straight
time and overtime work required of them by the company except
when an employee has a substantial and justifiable reason for not
working. '.."' An increase in customer orders necessitated the
implementation of overtime work schedules by Reynolds. Dewey
refused to work a Sunday shift and was discharged.
Dewey brought his action pursuant to section 703(a) alleging he
had been discriminated against on the basis of his religion. The
Court found for Reynolds and determined that:
The reason for Dewey's discharge was not discrimination on account of his religion; it was because he violated the provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement entered into by his union with
his employer, which provisions were applicable equally to all
employees.5
The Dewey holding manifests the early judicial reluctance to impose any substantial burdens on the employer to accommodate the
religious practices of its employees. But the court's emphasis on the
violation of the collective bargaining agreement was inapposite. The
primary issue of the case was the infringement of the employee's
religious rights. In determining whether there has been a violation
of the Act, it is submitted that the proper focal point should be the
religious motivation of the employee and not the provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement.
Moreover the Dewey court interpreted section 703(a) of the Act
to mandate that the employee prove that his employer had intentionally discriminated on the basis of religion.3 The imposition of
such a burden on the employee severely handicapped the effective34.
35.
36.

Id. at 328.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 331.
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ness of the Act in remedying religious discrimination.
These controversial conclusions prompted Congress to amend the
provisions of Title VII governing religious discrimination. 7 In 1972,
Congress enacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Act" which
clarified the broad prohibition against religious discrimination set
forth in section 703(a). Section 701(j)39 of the Amendment provides:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance
and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or
prospective employee's religious observance or practice without
undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.
THE IMPACT OF THE AMENDMENT

The legislative history of the Amendment reveals congressional
concern for the protection of religious rights in the area of private
employment to the same extent these rights have been protected
from governmental interference by the Constitution." The Amendment's definition of religion is substantively similar to that previously adopted by the the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 4 This definition affords protection to all aspects of the
37.

See Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1116 (5th Cir. 1972), where the court stated:
The total legislative history of this amendment appears at 118 Congressional
Record, §§ 227 - 253. There appears that Senator Randolph, of West Virginia, who
sponsored the amendment, explained that it was designed to resolve the issue left
open by the equal division of the Supreme Court of the United States in Dewey v.
Reynolds Metal Co., 402 U.S. 689, 91 S. Ct. 2186, 29 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1971). At 118
Congressional Record, § 228, Senator Randolph said:
I think in the Civil Rights Act we thus intended to protect the same rights
in private employment as the Constitution protects in Federal, State or local
governments. Unfortunately, the courts have, in a sense, come down on both
sides of the issue. The Supreme Court of the United States, in a case involving the observance of the Sabbath and job discrimination, divided evenly on
this question.
This amendment is intended, in good purpose, to resolve by legislation and in a way I think was originally intended by the Civil Rights Act - that
which the courts apparently have not resolved. I think it is needed not only
because court decisions have clouded the matter with some uncertainty; I
think this is an appropriate time for the Senate, and hopefully the Congress
of the United States, to go back, as it were, to what the Founding Fathers
intended.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
40. See Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1116 (5th Cir. 1972).
41. The legislative history of the Amendment reveals congressional approval of the guidelines on religious discrimination which had been previously adopted by the EEOC. See 29
C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1975).
Section 7016) - This subsection, which is new, defines "religion" to include all
aspects of religious observance, practice and belief, so as to require employers to
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employee's "religious observance and practice, as well as belief. 42
Thus it appears to incorporate the same test of religious belief
adopted by the courts in the Selective Service Cases.4" That test was
articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Seeger,"
where the Court held that "A sincere and meaningful belief which
occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by
the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes
within the statutory definition."4 5 The scope of this definition was
later broadened in Welsh v. United States" to include moral and
ethical beliefs as well. Consequently, the protection of religious liberties afforded to employees by the Amendment is broadly based.
A significant change accomplished by the Amendment was the
creation of an affirmative defense for employers. The Amendment
provides that if the employer can demonstrate that it is unable to
reasonably accommodate an employee's religious needs without
encountering undue hardship on its business, it has not engaged in
an unlawful employment practice under the Act. However, in
comparison to the strict requirements which the Dewey court placed
upon the employee, recent judicial intepretations of the Amendment indicate the courts are now imposing a considerably greater
duty on the employer to accommodate the employee.47 The statute
specifically emphasizes that it is for the employer to demonstrate
the reasonableness of accommodation or the existence of undue
hardship. Therefore, the burden of proving whether a reasonable
accommodation was made has shifted from the employee, as Dewey
required, to the employer.48
Further, since the enactment of the Amendment, the courts have
rejected the element of intent as a requisite to a finding of religious
make reasonable accommodations for employees whose "religion" may include observances, practices, and beliefs such as sabbath observance, which differ from the
employer's requirements regarding standards, schedules, or other business-related
employment conditions.
The purpose of this subsection is to provide the statutory basis for the EEOC to
formulate guidelines on discrimination because of religion such as those challenged
in Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Company.
118 CONG. REc. 7564 (1972).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. H, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
43. Note, Religious Discrimination in Employment: The 1972 Amendment - A
Perspective, 3 FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 327, 330 (1975).
44. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
45. Id. at 176.
46. 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970).
47. See Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Services, 373 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Ala.
1974).
48. Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1118 (5th Cir. 1972).
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discrimination under section 703(a). Analogous to the reasoning of
the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Company,4" the spirit
of the Title VII prohibitions has been construed to reach the effects
or consequences of discriminatory employment practices regardless
of intent.5 In Griggs, the Court found that an employer who conditioned the assignment of high paying jobs on the completion of high
school or on the passing of a general intelligence test had committed
race discrimination under section 703(a). Although both requirements were admittedly neutral on their face, they operated to disqualify blacks at a substantially higher rate than whites., As stated
by Chief Justice Burger in the majority opinion:
• . . [G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as "built-in headwinds" for minority groups and are unrelated
to measuring job capability.
The Company's lack of discriminatory intent is suggested by
special efforts to help the undereducated employees through Company financing of two-thirds the cost of tuition for high school
training. But Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.
More than that, Congress has placed on the employer the burden
of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question. 2
In summary the present approach to a determination of the validity of a charge of religious discrimination under Title VII focuses
upon three major considerations:
(1) The nature of the belief held by the employee and whether
or not it is a bona fide religious belief under the Amendment's
definition of "religion."
(2) Determination of whether the employment practices of the
employer have had a discriminatory effect on the employee's exercise of his religious observances or practices.
(3) Determination of whether the employer has overcome his burden of proving it has reasonably accommodated the employee or
that it cannot accommodate the employee without suffering undue
hardship on the conduct of its business.
The third consideration has created great uncertainty as to what
measures an employer must take to comply with the law.
49.
50.
51.
52.

401 U.S. 424 (1971).
See Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 468 F.2d. 346 (6th Cir. 1972).
401 U.S. at 430.
Id. at 432.
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ACCOMMODATE: SOME ATTEMPT REQUIRED

It is generally held that the employer has a legal duty to make at
least some attempt to accommodate the religious needs of its employees. When no attempt at accommodation has been made employers have consistently been found to have violated the Act. In
Daniels v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. ,"' an employee was discharged for refusing to work on his Sabbath. The employee gave
notification of his inability to work and offered to work any hours
of any other days, or to accept a transfer to another installation. The
employer made no attempt to accommodate whatsoever, and at
trial relied on the defense that the law "did not require any positive
effort to accommodate." 54 This defense was rejected by the court
which found that, in the absence of any evidence of accommodation,
the employer had committed an unlawful employment practice pursuant to section 703(a).55 Likewise, in Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Services," an employee who was fired for insubordination for refusing to work on his Sabbath was not afforded any accommodation by his employer. Upon giving notice of his intention
to leave work early because of his religious convictions, the employee was advised that he would be regarded as "being in the same
category as employees who wished to get off work . . . to go to

football games.""7 In finding for the employee, the court called attention to the attitude and conduct of the employer as evidence of
bad faith. The court found that absolutely no attempt was made to
accommodate
the employee despite numerous opportunities to do
58
SO.

Further, a good faith belief that scheduling difficulties would
arise is not a valid excuse for failing to accommodate. In Claybaugh
v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 5 the employer legitimately believed it could not accommodate the employee's religious needs on
a permanent basis and accordingly made no attempt to do so. The
court, relying on the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court in
Griggs,"° rejected the employer's argument:
Bell's overall position seems to be that so long as it studied a
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

7 F.E.P. Cas. 1323 (D. Ore. 1972).
Id. at 1324.
Id.
373 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
Id. at 943.
Id. at 944.
355 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ore. 1973).
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
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situation and in good faith believed that scheduling difficulties
prevented a permanent scheduling solution to accommodate Claybaugh's religious needs, a discharge of Claybaugh would be lawful
...
. This is not the "making" of a reasonable accommodation.
The fact that an employer's motives were pure does not obviate the
illegality of a discharge. While there is no question but that Bell
thought it had complied with the Act, nonetheless, as Chief Justice
Burger stated, "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation."",
The employer is under an obligation to take some affirmative
steps toward accommodation when confronted with an employee
who requires special treatment because of his religion. Failure to
make any effort will virtually ensure a finding that the employer
committed an unlawful employment practice. The cautious employer, therefore, would be wise to initiate reasonable measures of
accommodation. Only by taking such measures can the employer
preserve its defense that accommodation creates an undue hardship
on its business. 2
THE REASONABLENESS OF THE ACCOMMODATION

The amount of proof required to show a reasonable accommodation of an employee's religious needs is far from clear. The primary
cause of this uncertainty is the lack of clarity of the term "reasonable accommodation." Some courts have attempted to formulate a
more definitive criterion, e.g., that an employer must make a "good
faith effort" to accommodate 3 or that it has an "affirmative duty"
to accommodate. These are too vague to provide an employer with
any reasonable degree of predictability as to what is, and what is
not, a reasonable accommodation under the provisions of the
Amendment. Somewhat more definite are the guidelines adopted
by the EEOC.6 5 Congress intended these guidelines to have the
61. 355 F. Supp. at 6.
62. Id.
63. Johnson v. United States Postal Service, 497 F.2d 128, 130 (5th Cir. 1974).
64. Claybaugh v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D. Ore. 1973).
65. Section 713(a) of the Act enables the EEOC to adopt guidelines to carry out the
provisions of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1970). In 1967, the EEOC amended its guidelines on religious discrimination to the present form.
Observation of the Sabbath and other religious holidays. (a) Several complaints
filed with the Commission have raised the question whether it is discrimination on
account of religion to discharge or refuse to hire employees who regularly observe
Friday evening and Saturday, or some other day of the week, as the Sabbath or who
observe certain special religious holidays during the year and as a consequence, do
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force of law,"0 and they have been so construed.67 But even their
value has been undercut by the emphasis which the Commission
has placed on a case-by-case approach to the resolution of religious
discrimination disputes. Guideline 1605.1(d) provides:
The Commission will review each case on an individual basis in an
effort to seek an equitable application of these guidelines to the
variety of situations which arise due to the varied religious practices of the American people."
The employer who must prove accommodation during litigation is
faced with a perplexing problem.
Equally perplexed is the employer who wishes to take the necessary steps to comply with the requirements of the law before a
dispute reaches litigation. In deciding whether to submit to its employee's religious demands, the employer must weigh the consequences of each of three alternatives. The first alternative is full
accommodation or total submission to the employee's demands.
This necessarily involves consideration of the expenses and inconveniences the employer may encounter in implementing the necessary
means of accommodation. The employee's second alternative is to
make no accommodation whatever and either to fire the employee
or dock his pay for his time off. This alternative is the least advisable because the employer runs a risk of committing an unlawful
employment practice." The third alternative is conciliation and
not work on such days. (b) The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds, required by Section 703(a) (1) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, includes an obligation on the part of the employer to make reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of employees and prospective employees where such
accommodations can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business. Such undue hardship, for example, may exist where the employee's needed work cannot be performed by another employee of substantially
similar qualifications during the period of absence of the Sabbath observer. (c)
Because of the particularly sensitive nature of discharging or refusing to hire an
employee or applicant on account of his religious beliefs, the employer has the
burden of proving that an undue hardship renders the required accommodation to
the religious needs of the employee unreasonable. (d) The Commission will review
each case on an individual basis in an effort to seek an equitable application of these
guidelines to the variety of situations which arise due to the varied religious practices of the American people.
29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1975).
66. See discussion of legislative history of the Act, note 37 supra.
67. See Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1972).
68. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (d) (1975).
69. Section 706(g) of the Act provides remedies that courts may administer upon determination that an employer has committed an unlawful employment practice. That section
provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
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compromise with the employee. This is clearly the most advantageous approach from the employer's viewpoint and provides the
employer with an opportunity to limit losses by means of compromise. Thus, the employer retains the services of its employee without the burdens of litigation. However, the lack of a clear definition
as to what constitutes a reasonable accommodation under the
Amendment makes the achievement of a fair and effective compromise difficult.
THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING A STANDARD

It is not surprising that the courts have been unable to successfully formulate more specific criteria defining the reasonableness
which is required under the Amendment. Such an effort verges upon
impossibility. Each case involving an allegation of religious discrimination presents its own unique set of facts, and each is tempered
with varying degrees of emotion. The subject of accommodating an
employee's religious needs is simply not conducive to the adoption
of a well-defined standard. In considering the diverse and often
unusual religious beliefs and practices of the American people,70 the
holding of each case should be limited to the facts presented before
the court. Equally diverse are the forms which undue hardship takes
and the severity with which they affect various business enterprises.
For example, the size and nature of an employer's business will have
a direct bearing on the burden it will encounter in accommodating
an employee. In view of these considerations, the courts' reliance on
a subjective method of determining the existence of religious discrimination is well founded. Unfortunately, such an approach does
not provide the employer with any reasonable degree of predictability concerning its obligation under the law. The employer must
look to the case law for guidance.
An investigation of the case law reveals that the extent of the
employer's duty of accommodation is limited by two considerations.
engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice
and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but
is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay
(payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case
may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date
more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission. Interim
earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons
discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
70. For further discussion, see note 26 supra.
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The first consideration focuses on the reasonableness, from the employee's viewpoint, of the employer's efforts to accommodate. The
courts have not required the employer to submit to every demand
of the employee. The employee must also be willing to cooperate
with the employer in resolving the conflict." In Fisher v. Alsing,72
the court precluded an employee from recovering because he did not
make a reasonable effort to relocate his residence to accommodate
his employer's work schedule. Similarly, in Kettel v. Johnson &
Johnson" the court determined that the employer had made reasonable alternative proposals to accommodate the employee. The employee, a member of the Radio Church of God, refused to work a
Saturday overtime shift in recognition of his religious obligation to
refrain from work on his Sabbath. The employer offered a proposal
that the employee work on Saturday only when it was necessary that
all employees of his job classification work. The employee rejected
the proposal. The court found that this effort to accommodate was
sufficient in view of the size of the employer's business and upheld
the employee's discharge.74 Therefore, when confronted with a reasonable accommodation by the employer, the employee must be
willing to accept it.
The second consideration limiting the employer's obligation to
accommodate is the existence of undue hardship. The defense of
undue hardship is vital to the employer because of the wide range
of factual circumstances to which it is applicable. If the effect of
accommodation on the business is severe, the employer may be
excused from meeting the employee's religious requirements. The
need to balance these opposing considerations of accommodation
and undue hardship was perceived by the court in Claybaugh v.
Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. :'The requirement upon an employer to make a reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of an employee is not unbending.
However, an employer cannot sustain its burden of showing undue
hardship without first showing that it made an accommodation as
an attempted remedy. As the degree of business hardship increases, the quantity of conduct which will satisfy the reasonable
accommodation requirement decreases. The balancing of reasonableness and hardship is what I believe Chief Justice Burger was
71. See Note, Religious Discrimination in Employment: The 1972 Amendment
Perspective, 3 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 327, 339 (1975).
72. 7 F.E.P. Cas. 220, 221 (D. Ore. 1974).
73. 337 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
74. Id. at 894.
75. 355 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ore. 1973).
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referring to as the "business necessity" which would qualify as a
legitimate reason for discharging an employee."
This balancing approach provides the employer with little guidance concerning the extent of accommodation required of it. An
analysis of court decisions subsequent to the Amendment is helpful.
There are areas of consensus regarding what constitutes reasonable
accommodation and what amounts to undue hardship. However,
the courts are not in full agreement regarding the validity of some
measures of accommodation and claims of hardship. An investigation of some of the more prominent defenses corroborates this point.
COLLECrIvE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS

The existence of a collective bargaining agreement or union contract is a common basis upon which employers have relied in defense of their inability to accommodate. Often the provisions of such
agreements prohibit the employer from giving preferential treatment to an employee other than on the basis of a seniority system
or some other type of merit system. Religious belief is seldom, if
ever, a valid basis for special treatment. When confronted by an
employee who demands preferential treatment because of his religion, the employer may either grant the preferential treatment and
in so doing violate the collective bargaining agreement, or rely on
the agreement as a basis for the defense of undue hardship. The
issue was explored in the Dewey" case where the court refused to
compel the employer to violate its union agreement in order to accomodate the employee. The court suggested that the need to protect the internal affairs of employers and unions through the collective bargaining process outweighed the consequences that such
78
agreements might have on one's religion.
Despite congressional discontent with the Dewey decision," the
position adopted by that court regarding the use of a collective
bargaining agreement as a valid defense has not been abandoned.
Subsequent to the enactment of the 1972 Amendment, a district
court in Hardison v. Trans World Airlines0 held that an employer's
duty to accommodate did not take priority over seniority provisions
of a collective bargaining agreement. The employer in that case had
made three separate attempts to accommodate the employee's reli76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 6.
429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
429 F.2d at 328.
See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
375 F. Supp. 877 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
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gious demands, but each proposal was rejected. Further accommodation would have resulted in the employer violating provisions of
the agreement. The court determined that Congress had not intended to require employers to take actions that could impinge upon
bona fide seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.8 '
The reasoning of the court was founded upon section 703(h) of the
Act which provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply
different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority
or merit system. . . , provided that such differences are not the
result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... 12
Not finding any evidence of intentional discrimination in the application of the agreement as the section requires, the court was compelled to hold in favor of the employer.
However, not all courts concur that such agreements abrogate the
employer's duty to accommodate. In Claybaugh v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., the court ruled that an employer could not rely
solely on the terms of a union contract in the absence of any attempt
to accommodate. The employer contended that it was bound by its
union contract to balance its work schedules in accord with regular
time and premium time wage scales. Therefore, it could not accommodate the complaining employee, a Seventh Day Adventist, who
required every Friday night off to observe his Sabbath. The court
disregarded the effect of the union contract on the employer's duty
to accommodate. It found the employer was under a duty to provide
a temporary accommodation until the possibility of a permanent
remedy could be investigated.84 Similarly, in Shaffield v. Northrop
Worldwide Aircraft Services, 5 the court rejected the employer's
defense which was founded on a seniority provision of its collective
bargaining agreement. The court recognized that in certain situations an employer's duty to accommodate might be limited by such
a provision. However, scrutiny of the agreement revealed that seniority was not the only basis the employer could use to give preferen81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 883.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
355 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ore. 1973).
Id. at 5.
373 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
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tial treatment to employees. 6 Another broad basis which the agreement provided was efficiency of plant operation. The court reconciled these two bases:
In some cases, the existence of a seniority agreement might limit
the freedom of an employer to effect the necessary reasonable accommodation. . . . In this case, however, it is clear that the
collective bargaining contract does not bind the company to the
sole use of seniority in the making of shift assignments ....
When management retains such flexibility of operation, it cannot
be heard to plead that its hands are tied by a seniority agreement.
And, in addition, even if the company were so bound, it may well
be that the company's 87burden includes seeking union consent to
some form of variance.
There is obvious conflict among these decisions. If any trend or
pattern has emerged over the last several years, it has been the
increasing reliance by the lower courts on the rationale adopted by
the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.8 This line of reasoning recognizes that although a collective bargaining agreement
may be neutral on its face, it can effectively discriminate on the
basis of religion. Such an agreement serves to reinforce the "builtin headwinds" of discrimination alluded to by Chief Justice Burger
in Griggs.81 If the agreement itself is not found to foster discriminatory employment practices, then the duty of accommodation would
seem to impose an obligation on the employer to seek union consent
to make an exception to the contract. In view of this approach, it is
submitted that an employer's sole reliance on the agreement as a
defense would be ill-advised.
SIZE AND NATURE OF THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE

The size of an employer's business has a direct bearing on the
degree of flexibility it possesses in modifying the work schedules of
its employees and its production timetables. Employers have successfully utilized this fact to limit the extent of accommodation
86.

The provision of the collective bargaining agreement in issue stated:
The company agrees to the principle that shift and odd work week preference for
available jobs should be given to senior employees in each classification. It is recognized, however, that it is impossible to operate the plant efficiently with all the
senior employees in a particular classification on any shift, and that classification
seniority cannot be the sole determining factor in making shift assignments.
Id. at 942.
87. Id. at 942.
88. Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
89. Id. at 432.
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required of them. In Johnson v. United States Postal Service,9 0 the
employer was a small branch office of the United States Postal
Service in Chattahoochee, Florida. A total of five clerks were employed: two full-time, two part-time, and one temporary. An employee who held one of the part-time positions refused to work on
Saturdays because of his religion and was subsequently fired. The
court recognized that the size of the post office required that it
employ a truly flexible employee in the part-time position, and that
the post office would suffer undue hardship if required to retain the
employee. Similarly, in Kettel v. Johnson & Johnson,9 ' the employer
successfully argued that the nature of its business prevented accommodation. In order to avoid laying off workers during the slack
season, it employed a small number of employees year-round who
would be able to work overtime during the peak season. An employee who refused to work a Saturday overtime shift because of his
religion was discharged. The court found that the considerable inconvenience which the employee's religious demands created on the
employer constituted undue hardship.2
In Claybaugh v. Pacific Bell Tel. Co.,9 3 the size of the employer's
operation worked to his disadvantage. In that case, the employee
was a member of a two-man transmission team who was discharged
because he refused to work Saturdays in contravention of the tenets
of his faith. The employer contended that a permanent accommodation was impossible. The court found that "Bell's size as an employer defies any conclusion other than that an open position could
be found within a short time where [the employee's] religious
needs could be permanently accommodated." 94 Recognition of the
varying degrees of hardship encountered by employers because of
the size and nature of their businesses is a sound policy. To ignore
these considerations would be to impose unequal burdens on the
various segments of the business community. In construing undue
hardship in this flexible manner, the courts have provided themselves the necessary latitude to judge each employer's defense on its
own merits.
COMPANY POLICY

The question whether an employer is required to make an exception to an established company policy in seeking to accommodate
90. 364 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Fla. 1973).
91. 337 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
92. Id.at 895.
93. 355 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ore. 1973).
94. Id.at 5.
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its employee's religious needs was dealt with in Reid v. Memphis
Publishing Company." In that case, an applicant for a job as a
copyreader was refused employment by the Memphis PressScimiter newspaper. The basis for the refusal was the applicant's
affiliation with the Seventh Day Adventist faith whose tenets forbade employment on Saturdays. The newspaper had established a
policy that all of its employees be available for work seven days a
week, and had never hired an employee with the understanding that
he would be relieved from working on any particular day. The district court found for the newspaper on the basis of its longstanding
company policy." On appeal, the circuit court relied on Griggs7 and
concluded that although the company's hiring policies were not
applied discriminatorily, such policies had the effect of discriminating on the basis of religion." Thus, in the absence of more specific
evidence of hardship, the existence of a company policy applied in
a non-discriminatory manner is not a valid defense and does not
abrogate the duty to accommodate.
Other decisions have followed this line of reasoning and have
required that the employer make an attempt to adjust a policy
which acts to discriminate against particular employees' religious
convictions.9 Having to make an exception to established company
95. 468 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1972).
96. Id. at 348-49.
97. Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
98. 468 F.2d at 352-53. In his concurring opinion, Judge Thomas set the requirements the
employer must meet to use company policy as a valid defense to mitigate his duty to accommodate:
Since the case is being remanded for action consistent with the Court's opinion,
I think it necessary to elaborate on some of the matters expressed in the Court's
opinion. The trial court should apply the test of the regulation directly to the policy
of the Press-Scimitarthat requires all employees to be available for work on Saturday and refuses to guarantee a new or old employee a particular day off. In applying
the test to this policy and requirement of the Press-Scimitarthe trial court will be
governed by Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
and its conclusion that in the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act,
•. .Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any
given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in
question.
The record reveals the existence of a policy and requirement of not guaranteeing
any employee a specific day off. To uphold such a policy and requirement the trial
court must find that the employer has sustained his burden of demonstrating that
such policy and practice is necessitated by the requirements of the employer's
business and find further that such policy and practice is applied equally to all
employees.
468 F.2d at 352-53 (Thomas, J., concurring).
99. See, e.g., Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972); Young v. Southwestern
Savings & Loan Association, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975).
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policy, in and of itself, does not necessarily create undue hardship.
In addition, the discriminatory effect on other employees when one
is exempted from company policy because of his religion cannot be
considered undue hardship.'1° The defense of undue hardship, therefore, requires more than mere assertions of intangible factors detrimental to the employer's business.
MONETARY LOSSES

The most successful arguments raised by employers are those
which evidence monetary losses incurred in accommodation. For
example, in Dixon v. Omaha Public Power District'"1 the court
found that a utility lineman who was a member of a two-man service
crew could not have his religious needs accommodated without the
imposition of undue hardship on his employer. Two factors gave rise
to the employer's hardship. Accommodation would have required
the employer to alter work schedules and to pay additional overtime
wages.' 2 Similarly, in Roberts v. Hermitage Cotton Mills'0 3 it was
held that requiring the employer to find a temporary replacement
for an employee who possessed specialized skills created undue
hardship. The complaining employee possessed a high level of expertise as a loom fixer, but because of his religion he could not work
a regular Friday shift. To replace him the employer would have been
forced to require one of its other employees to work a 16-hour shift.
This would have necessitated the payment of a premium wage and
created a safety risk. The court ruled that the employee's discharge
was not an unlawful employment practice.
In Hardisonv. Trans World Airlines,'0 4 both the expense of premium wages and the burden of finding a suitable replacement were
considered. There the court aptly stated that "Title VII cannot be
interpreted to require that companies finance [an] employee's religious beliefs."'0 5
These cases demonstrate that the courts are inclined to find
undue hardship if the employer's attempt at accommodation involves pecuniary loss. As Hardison indicates, the courts have declined to construe the requirements of Title VII as subordinating the
100. See Shaffield v. Northrop Aircraft Services, 373 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Ala. 1974); but
see Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
101. 385 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Neb. 1974).
102. Id. at 1386.
103. 8 F.E.P. Cas. 315, 316 (D.S.C. 1973).
104. 375 F. Supp. 877 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
105. Id. at 891.
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employer's profit motivation to the religious demands of his employees.
CONCLUSION

The present status of the requirement of reasonable accommodation is uncertain. The uncertainty stems from the case-by-case approach the courts have taken in applying the requirement. The
reasons for this approach are twofold. First, the necessary accommodation of an employer's religious needs varies with the practices of
his faith. Second, the impact of accommodation on the employer
varies with the flexibility of its business operation. For these reasons, the requirement of reasonable accommodation simply does not
lend itself to the formulation of well-defined guidelines.
This leaves the employer in an awkward position. The approach
adopted by the courts is not conducive to a reasonable prediction
of prohibited conduct. However, the case law does reveal that the
employer is required to take some affirmative accommodative measures to preserve the defense of undue hardship. In addition, the
courts have generally rejected defenses based upon intangible losses
incurred in accommodation. Defenses such as breach of a collective
bargaining agreement, administrative inconveniences, the unequal
administration of company policy, and the discriminatory impact
of accommodation on other employees have largely been repudiated.
Greater weight has been given to defenses founded upon evidence
of substantial monetary losses incurred in accommodating the employee. Cost data, production output figures, additional overtime
expenses, and other evidence which substantiate the employer's
contentions are required. The employer's course of action must
strike a balance between the costs incurred in accommodation and
the values attached to religious freedom. Only when this balance is
struck are religious liberties accorded their proper protection in our
capitalistic system of government.
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